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The ‘One Who Knocks’ and the ‘One Who Waits’: 





This article provides a cultural criminological analysis of the acclaimed US television series, 
Breaking Bad.  It is argued here that – as a cultural text – Breaking Bad is emblematic of an 
agenda for change surrounding criminological theories of peoples’ propensity to do harm to 
one another.  To exemplify this, the show’s central (male) protagonist is revealed to undergo a 
complete biosocial transformation into a violent offender and as such, demonstrate the need 
for criminological theory to recognise and further reflect upon this process.  However, at the 
same time, the (re)presented inability of the show’s female characters to do the same is 
indicative of a number of gender-related questions that progressive criminological theories of 
violence need to answer.  In considering these two fields in tandem the show’s criminological 
significance is established; it is symbolic of the need for criminology to afford greater 
recognition to the nuanced intersections of both biological and sociological factors in the 










You see, ‘technically’, chemistry is the study of matter.  But I prefer to see it as: the study 
of change.  Electrons change their energy levels, molecules change their bonds, elements 
combine and change into compounds.  But that’s all of life, right?  It’s the constant, it’s the 
cycle; it’s solution, dissolution, just over and over and over.  It is growth, then decay, then 
transformation.  It’s fascinating really – it’s a shame so many of us never take time to 
consider its implications. 
Walter White, S01 E01 
 
This article provides a cultural criminological analysis of the acclaimed US television series, 
Breaking Bad.  It investigates this show as a form of ‘popular criminology’ (Rafter & Brown, 
2011) and seeks to add to the theoretical advances made in recent years by scholars researching 
the multiple intersections between academic criminology and various popular cultural forms 
(e.g., Atkinson and Rodgers, 2016; Brown and Rafter, 2013; Carrabine, 2012; Linnemann, 
2015; O’Brien et al., 2005; Phillips & Strobl, 2013; Rafter, 2007; Wakeman, 2014).  It is argued 
here that – as a cultural text – Breaking Bad provides an ideal means through which three 
interlinked fields of criminological study can be advanced: those surrounding gender, violence, 
and the biosocial nature of the human subject.  To support this claim the article works towards 
three aims: (1) to demonstrate the extent to which Breaking Bad’s (re)presentation of male 
violence resonates with progressive and transformative criminological theories of interpersonal 
violence (e.g. Hall, 2012a; Hall and Winlow, 2015); (2) to reveal the extent to which the show’s 
depictions of female violence (or lack thereof) problematises and complicates such theoretical 
developments; and then (3), to position Breaking Bad as emblematic of the need for 
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contemporary criminologists to think more openly – yet no less critically – about the role of 
biology in shaping and directing human action. 
Breaking Bad is certainly a worthy site for an investigation like this.  As part of the post 
millennium transformation of the TV medium (see Mittell, 2015) it ran for five seasons 
between 2008 and 2013.  Like its contemporaries The Sopranos and The Wire, it is essentially 
a crime drama focussing upon the increasing trials and tribulations of ‘difficult men’ (Martin, 
2013).  The show received considerable praise from numerous sources – the Writers Guild of 
America rank it as the 13th best written TV series ever; it won no fewer than sixteen Primetime 
Emmy Awards (out of almost 60 nominations); and it received the 2013 Golden Globe award 
for Best TV Drama Series.  In addition to this it has also started to gain attention from within 
various academic fields: Kopak and Sefiha (2015) highlight its pedagogic potential with 
recourse to teaching Katz’s (1988) ‘ways of the badass’; Tzanelli and Yar (2016) usefully 
demonstrate its extended cultural significance through the ‘televisual tourism’ that has come 
to accompany it; Jaramillo (2014) designates it a key point in the cultural evolution of TV 
representations of Mexican drug dealers; and Linnemann (2016) uses it to great effect in his 
compelling analysis of methamphetamine’s ‘cultural imaginary’ in the U.S. drug war.  
Moreover, a recent edition (Vol. 45, Issue 2) of the New Mexico Law Review is dedicated to 
the show and its intersections with legal studies.  However, as of yet, a thorough criminological 
investigation of the show’s depictions of violence is yet to be undertaken.1 
This dearth of criminological analyses of Breaking Bad is surprising considering its cultural 
reception, yet it is rendered even more so by the fact that this show is emblematic of a – perhaps 
even the – core criminological question.  Namely, how is it that some people can go from being 
law abiders to law breakers?  Why do some people ‘break bad’?  How is it possible for someone 
to go from – in the words of the show’s creator, Vince Gilligan – ‘Mr Chips to Scarface’?2  
Breaking Bad constitutes an important cultural paradigm of the debates that surround these 
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questions and thus, its criminological significance should not be underestimated.  A core claim 
made here is this: the transformation from Mr Chips to Scarface is just that – a transformation.  
And, moreover, one that occurs at both biological and sociological levels.  In this respect 
Breaking Bad is emblematic of wider developments in social scientific/philosophical thought 
that seek to better integrate the biological and social sciences (see Braidotti, 2002; Johnston 
and Malabou, 2013; Meloni, 2014; Meloni et al., 2016; Rose, 2013; Wilson, 2004; Žižek, 
2006).  While some criminologists have embraced biosocial thinking (e.g. Delisi, 2013; Owen, 
2012; Walsh and Beaver, 2009), cultural and/or critical criminologists have been somewhat 
hesitant to do so.  As such, a core purpose of the present article is demonstrating the potentials 
of such engagement for cultural criminology. 
Towards these ends the article opens with a brief introduction to the study of ‘popular 
criminology’ followed by an equally brief overview of Breaking Bad.  The mainstay of the 
article is then split via two sections.  The first is concerned with positioning Walter White 
(Bryan Cranston) as the ‘the one who knocks’, as the ‘transcendental materialist subject’ (Hall, 
2012a, 2012b; Johnston, 2008) whose violent ways become inscribed at the very core of their 
being.  The second is concerned with Walter’s wife, Skyler White (Anna Gunn) and the ways 
in which her apparent inability to ‘break bad’ in the same way as her husband problematises 
and complicates the aforementioned theory of transcendental materialism and its 
criminological extrapolation.  Throughout both though, the overall goal remains constant: to 
position Breaking Bad as a cultural embodiment of criminological debates about violence in 
the ‘century of biology’ that Nikolas Rose (2013) has claimed we now live.  Crucially, in 
working towards this aim, Breaking Bad is firmly revealed as emblematic of the future heuristic 
potentials (and pitfalls) of an increased criminological sensitivity towards the bio-social 




Reading Breaking Bad as Popular Criminology 
What follows below is predicated upon understanding Breaking Bad as existing as a cultural 
text, as a form of ‘popular criminology’.  Popular criminology is, for Nicole Rafter (2007: 
415), a set of ‘discourses about crime found not only in film but also on the Internet, on 
television and in newspapers, novels and rap music and myth’.  There is significant utility to 
be found in studying representations of criminological subjects like these – they provide a 
means by which the criminological imagination can be extended.  Criminologists have 
recognised this for some time now, and the discipline’s relationship with cultural forms has 
progressed healthily from the days of understanding reality and representation as being discrete 
from one another.  Questions are frequently asked now around the ways in which popular 
culture and academic theory can be fused to develop and enhance understandings of any given 
subject.  That is, as Rafter and Brown (2011: 2) note, the study of popular criminology is about 
‘demonstrating that popular culture can expand formal theory–and that the encounter of theory 
with cinema [to give but one example] is an engagement that leaves both fundamentally 
transformed’. 
Importantly for Rafter (2007), academic and popular criminologies should not be viewed as 
alternative forms of knowledge, but rather as complementary.  However, as Carrabine (2008) 
sensibly notes, some caution is required around the need to recognise good and bad examples 
of both; while some strands of criminological knowledge do less than others to inform around 
their subjects, some representations do more than others to shape and redirect understandings 
of crime.  The interface between strong examples from either side – and it is argued here that 
Breaking Bad is a strong example – has considerable heuristic potential.  This is why, again 
for Carrabine (2008), the ‘texts, audiences and industries’ of popular culture must regularly 
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form the targets of criminological research.  This however poses a number of questions around 
how such research should be done. 
There are different epistemic/methodological approaches available here that can be roughly 
divided between those that take the more traditionally social scientific approach of viewing 
representations as ideological conduits that transmit meaning, and those that are more closely 
akin to literary theory which view representations as being tangled up in postmodern processes 
of meaning-making/negotiation.  Both have their merits and limitations, and consequently the 
most appropriate course to take is one that incorporates the strengths of each; what Majid Yar 
(2010: 77) has usefully termed a ‘synthetic and critical’ approach to reading crime media.  
From such a position, the task is to understand Breaking Bad as both conveying meaning and 
being open to interpretation at the same time.  This, for Yar (2010), allows for an appreciation 
of the diverse nuances of representations to be set alongside their wider social/political 
relevance.  Thus, the study of criminological representations does well to start from a point 
similar to that which Stuart Hall (1981: 443) described as the ‘double stake of popular culture’.  
That is, the double movement of containment and resistance which it always contains.  As TV 
shows both generate and convey meaning at the same time, they are ideological conduits and 
challenge hegemony at the same time.  This epistemic position facilitates the expansion and 
transformation of academic theory through engagement with representations.  It encourages 
the questioning of the ways in which Breaking Bad conveys latent ideologies of gender and 
violence, and it also permits investigations of the ways in which the show challenges forms of 




Breaking Bad: A Brief Summary 
Before progressing into the analysis described above however, a brief overview of Breaking 
Bad is required for the unfamiliar reader.  Set in Albuquerque, New Mexico, the show tells the 
story of Walter White, a high-school chemistry teacher in his early fifties who is diagnosed 
with terminal lung cancer.  Lacking adequate health insurance, Walter realises that in the event 
of his impending death his wife, disabled teenage son, and unborn baby girl will be left in 
financial peril.  He reads this situation as the latest in a long line of his failures, underpinned 
by his perceived inability thus far in life to fulfil his potential.  He is a brilliant chemist, yet 
bought out early of the company he and his university friend set up as students (which to his 
further dismay is now worth millions).  He is an impassioned teacher, yet his financial 
circumstances mean he has to take a second job at a car wash where his students mock him as 
he cleans the wheels on their sports cars.  And, he is a loving father who would do anything 
for his children, yet his cancer will ultimately prevent him from from fulfilling this potential 
too.  All of the above come together in one moment in season one episode four (hereafter, S01 
E04) when Hank Schrader – Walter’s hyper-masculine DEA agent brother-in-law (Dean 
Norris) – rather awkwardly lets him know that when he dies, he will provide for his wife and 
children in his place.  For Walter, this is the final insult.  It is at this point that something of a 
transformation starts to occur; from here on in Walter embraces the criminality the viewer has 
witnessed him flirting with in the opening episodes – it is here that Walter White ‘breaks bad’. 
Walter then embarks upon a course of action that, through a reunion with a former pupil 
Jesse Pinkman (Aaron Paul), involves producing and selling crystal methamphetamine.  With 
his chemistry knowledge to assist him, Walt and Jesse produce the purest, strongest 
methamphetamine on the market and as such, are able to climb to the very top of the illicit drug 
trade.  This ascent is anything but peaceful though; by the end of the show Walter has been 
directly implicated in the deaths of 27 people.3  Here the viewer sees the extent of Walter’s 
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transformation – he changes from a mild-mannered teacher to a calculating killer who on more 
than one occasion executes those who stand in his way without a second’s hesitation.  Over the 
course of five seasons we see Walter become something else, he becomes ‘Heisenberg’.  
However, this is not just a ‘street’ name that Walt adopts, it is not just his alter ego, Walter 
becomes Heisenberg at the very core of his being.  In this respect, the name is most apt.4 
Through this transformation, Walter causes untold misery to those around him, but perhaps 
none more so than his wife.  Their relationship and its deterioration is a key theme of the show 
as Skyler comes to know of Walt’s criminality and albeit to a lesser degree, becomes involved 
herself.  However, the viewer does not see Skyler ‘break bad’ in the same explosively violent 
way as her husband – they see a more passive, indirect will to violence that is sexualised and 
inextricably bound up with her feminine form.  Skyler does not break bad in the same way 
Walter does, and this has extensive symbolic importance.  Thus, in Breaking Bad two distinct 
problematics are visible with theoretical significance to criminology: (1) a challenge to some 
of the field’s dominant understandings of interpersonal violence through Walter’s 
transformation; and (2), the reaffirmation of patriarchal values around women’s propensities 
towards, and capacities for, this same type of violence through Skyler’s apparent inability to 
engage in it in the same way the show’s men do. 
 
 
The One Who Knocks: Walter White as the ‘Transcendental Materialist 
Subject’ 
 
Who are you talking to right now?  Who is it you think you see?  Do you know how much 
I make a year?  I mean, even if I told you, you wouldn’t believe it.  Do you know what 
would happen if I suddenly decided to stop going into work?  A business, big enough that it 
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could be listed on the NASDAQ, goes belly up.  Disappears!  It ceases to exist, without me!  
No, you clearly don’t know who you’re talking to, so let me clue you in: I am not in danger, 
Skyler – I am the danger.  A guy opens his door and gets shot and you think that of me?  
No.  I am the one who knocks! 
Walter White, S04 E06 
 
In the above extract Walt makes something clear to Skyler – he is no longer the passive, weak, 
failure of a man that he thinks she sees him as.  He has changed.  To add some context, Skyler 
has recently heard of the death of a man connected to Walt’s meth business and is pleading 
with him to get out of the trade.  She suggests he is ‘in over his head’ and that he calls the 
police to confess all and seek protection.  She intimates that he does so as the cancer-stricken 
school teacher, as a ‘victim’ of ruthless gangsters who have exploited him and his 
circumstances.  However Walter no longer sees himself in this light, and for very good reason 
too.  When he declares himself to be ‘the danger’, he means it.  By this point Walt has changed, 
in his appearance as well as his attitude and demeanour.  He has become Heisenberg; he is the 
same man, but different.  This matters because it is this transformation that is emblematic of a 
potential challenge to criminological theories of the ways in which people become violent.  
Walter’s transformation is not just discursive, nor is it merely symbolic, and neither is it some 
sort of social constructionism either.  While it retains elements of all of these, it is so much 
more; it is a foundational change at the very core of his material being, he has become 
something that previously he was not. 
Such pathways into violent offending have been studied by criminologists for a long time, 
and there are multiple accounts surrounding the ways in which they can be understood.  To 
make sense of them thematically, Ray (2011) notes that in the case of interpersonal violence 
like Walter’s, there is a broad conceptual divide between theories that are primarily biological 
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and of an ‘evolutionary’ nature (those that hold violence to be an ‘adaptive trait’ present in all 
humans and necessary to our evolution), and those that are more ‘social’ in their nature (those 
that stem from the fields of psychology, sociology and criminology).  Regarding the latter, 
these extend from what might be termed ‘the foundational’ right up to the 
contemporary/progressive.  For example, there are established theories that point towards the 
social environment that Walter finds himself in and the ways in which it can encourage the 
adoption of similar behaviours – the social learning theory of Burgess and Akers (1966) is 
indicative of this type of thinking.  Similarly, strain theories contend that certain structural 
contexts combined with certain cultural goals/ideals underpin deviant responses such as 
Walter’s (i.e., Merton, 1968).  Additionally, there are rational choice/routine activity-based 
theories that understand criminality as basic goal-orientated action designed to achieve given 
ends (Cohen and Felson, 1979).  Whilst there is certainly some merit in these, their ability to 
account for Walter’s actions is perhaps limited by its complexity; they remain foundational 
works that have since been superseded by an array of contemporary criminological theories 
more directly focused upon interpersonal violence. 
Katz’s (1988) concept of ‘righteous slaughter’ is certainly noteworthy as a more 
contemporary theory of violence, as is his more recent analysis of U.S. school shootings (Katz, 
2016).  Additionally, there are a number of compelling accounts involving gender and the ways 
in which masculinity in particular is associated with a will to violence (e.g. Messerschmidt, 
2012, 2013).  And then finally, the progressive and evolving corpus of psychosocial 
criminology offers significant and nuanced explanations for violent offending through 
incorporating the teachings of both psychology and sociology (see Gadd, 2003; Gadd and 
Jefferson, 2007; Robinson & Gadd, 2016).  However, despite their layers of complexity, the 
above do not recognise to the extent that they perhaps could what Hall (2012a) termed the 
‘thorny’ issue of biology.  That is, they do not take account of the fact that human action is 
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underpinned by biological processes, many of which the agent has limited or no control over 
or knowledge of.  This is not to discredit the aforementioned works as they did not set out to 
cover cover biosocial concerns – rather, it is to highlight the fact that the biological sphere is 
currently not recognised as comprehensively as it could be in contemporary criminologies of a 
cultural and/or critical nature (see Delisi, 2013). 
This represents something of a missed opportunity on criminology’s part; the incorporation 
of contemporary biology has great heuristic potential in terms of accounting for the violent 
transformation the Breaking Bad viewer witnesses.  In order to realise it however, it is 
important to recognise the development of what Walsh and Beaver (2009) call biosocial 
criminology as actually being much bigger than ‘criminology’; there has in recent years been 
an intellectual shift across the social sciences towards more materialistic, biologically-
informed understandings of the human subject.  The collection of works representative of this 
is both diverse and eclectic, yet the core claim running through them is roughly congruent – 
that human action is underpinned by the interactions between biology and environment (see 
Braidotti, 2002; Johnston and Malabou, 2013; Meloni, 2014; Rose, 2013; Wilson, 2004; Žižek, 
2006).  That is, humans do what they do, and become who they become, because of their 
biological makeup and the way it interacts with their social environment.  Epistemologically, 
this is predicated upon the convergence of two fields: sociology (and by association, 
criminology) and biology.  As Meloni notes: ‘sociology is becoming more open to biological 
suggestions, just at a time when biology is becoming more social’ (2014: 2, original emphasis).  
To exemplify this, sociologists are currently using neuroscience to help understand the 
changing nature of life in the modern city (Fitzgerald et al., 2014), and Chung et al. (2014) 
have convincingly positioned epigenetics as a ‘science’ of social science.  Importantly in the 
present context, the above collected are concerned with the nature of being – with the ways in 
which human beings exist in their worlds. 
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Philosophical understandings of the ways in which things exist are complex and convoluted, 
but an excellent overview can be found in Alain Badiou’s (2009) seminal text, Theory of the 
Subject.  Badiou (2009) notes that understandings of human existence (being) frequently hinge 
upon the relationship between the external world (material) and the thinking being (the ideal).  
He recounts five main philosophical understandings of this matrix: (1) ‘subjective 
metaphysical idealism’ where everything exists through ideal thought alone; (2) ‘objective 
metaphysical idealism’ (à la Kant) where the ideal thinking being exists as real, but only in so 
far as it is different to all other materially-existing ‘things-in-themselves’ which can only ever 
be perceived; (3) ‘dialectical idealism’ (à la Hegel) where thinking beings produce their 
externally existing realities; (4) ‘metaphysical materialism’ which reverses this and posits 
everything as existing in a purely material sense regardless of any thought or perception; and 
finally (5), ‘materialist dialectic’ (à la Marx) in which the material world and thought 
continually interact with each other to (re)produce both in a cyclical manner (Badiou, 2009: 
117-119.  See also, Badiou, 2005).  While the intricacies of these perspectives are not important 
right now, Badiou’s model is useful in that it provides the philosophical foundations for a line 
of thought that has significant relevance to the debates about violence of interest here, that of 
transcendental materialism. 
The term transcendental materialism was coined by the American psychoanalyst and 
philosopher Adrian Johnston (2008), and is predicated on his reading of the philosophy of 
Slavoj Žižek.  It can be understood as forming a sixth addition to Badiou’s typology from 
above, one that understands the material and the ideal as being irrecoverably intertwined in a 
mutually constitutive process of becoming.  It has recently been highlighted as holding great 
potential in criminology (Hall, 2012a, 2012b; Hall and Winlow, 2015; Winlow and Hall 2013).  
As a distinctive philosophy, it is best understood as an ‘ontology of the subject’ whereby: 
‘cogito-like subjectivity ontogenetically emerges out of an original corporeal condition as its 
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anterior ground, although, once generated, this sort of subjectivity thereafter remains 
irreducible to its material sources’ (Johnston, 2008: xxiv).  That is, this is a model of the human 
being whereby subjectivity (being) is understood to arise out of a bodily base (the human 
brain), but then needs to be understood as existing as ‘more than’ (as transcendental of) its 
material grounding.  In other words, the conditions of human possibility are rooted to the 
human body as it is out of this material entity that subjectivity arises.  Yet, crucially, once the 
subject has arisen it is no longer reducible to its material base as it is now caught up in a 
mutually constitutive relationship between the external webs of meaning that are 
culture/society, and the continually changing synaptic network of the human brain from which 
the subject emerges. 
In very basic terms, transcendental materialism is a synthesis between the teachings of 
critical social theory and contemporary neuroscience – between biology and sociology.  The 
inference is as follows: an identifiable human subject arises out of its material basis and then 
begins to interact with the social world it is thrust into, this interaction causes feedback which 
results in changes to the material body through the processes of neural plasticity that social 
neuroscientists are starting to reveal (see Cacioppo and Berntson, 2004).  This is admittedly a 
somewhat crass reduction of a complex set of neurobiological processes, but the essence of the 
theory is this: as the human being acts, the synaptic connections in the brain are either 
strengthened or weakened.  The brain exists in a state of plasticity – it changes in terms of its 
structure and functionality as the subject interacts with their worlds.  The implications of this 
for social theory are only just becoming apparent, but they are significant and should not be 
ignored (see Malabou, 2008, 2012).  If the brain is the central point out of which human 
subjectivity arises, then the fact that it exists in a transformative state must be relevant to 
knowledge of how people become what they are.  In essence, transcendental materialism holds 
that new and evolving subjects are continually emerging out of continually transforming human 
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bodies as they interact and reproduce their social worlds.  In this respect, the theory is bigger 
than crime and criminality – it is a way to theorise the very nature of social life. 
In this respect then, the adoption and extrapolation of transcendental materialism into 
criminological theory ought to be understood as the progressive evolution of a specific line of 
thought.  Hall’s (2012a) earlier work overviews his notion of the ‘pseudo-pacification process’ 
whereby the everyday violence of times gone by was repressed not through any sort of 
civilising process, but through the imperatives of capital that required a social order of civility 
to facilitate trade and the expansion of markets.  It is through this process that Hall (2012a) 
argued that status and prestige came to be associated with consumer symbolism over and above 
physicality.  This is neatly outlined in full detail by Hall and Winlow (2015: 115-120), but 
matters here in brief as it establishes the link between the material conditions of society and 
the changing nature of human subjectivity that transcendental materialism is ultimately 
predicated upon.  In this respect, Breaking Bad is again neatly symbolic – it is arguably the 
case that Walter’s pathway into violence was, in a large part, originally motivated by his 
rejection of pacification.  The material and symbolic rewards he witnessed others reaping were 
not forthcoming in his life, and this played a significant role in both him overcoming his 
aversion to violence, and then maintaining and embracing his newly found violent ways. 
While this article can only provide a brief overview of what is undoubtedly a complex 
philosophical orientation, it should be enough to underpin the core claim made here: that 
Walter White is the transcendental materialist subject.  He is a cultural embodiment of this line 
of philosophical thought.  He is the same person, but he has changed – this change is rooted in 
the interactions between the violent world he is now enmeshed within, and the plasticity of the 
human synapses that his subjectivity emerges out of.  As he sees, thinks, desires, fears and 
does, so he slowly but surely becomes.  This transformation is startlingly evident across the 
show: when he warns the rival meth cook, ‘stay out of my territory’ without so much as a blink 
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of the eye (S02 E10); when he insists that a gang of neo-Nazi thugs conduct a series of brutal 
murders exactly the way he wants them to be carried out (S05 E08); and then when he stands 
in the desert and instructs a rival drugs kingpin to ‘say my name’ before he will let a business 
transaction proceed (S05 E07), Breaking Bad is demonstrating that Walter has changed – that 
he has become Heisenberg.  In this respect, the show is more than congruent with a progressive 
line of criminological thought surrounding the ways in which people become and stay violent 
offenders; it challenges the hegemony of discursive and social constructivist accounts of human 
behaviour that relieve it of its material core. 
It is for this reason that Walter’s cancer is central to understanding Breaking Bad; it is 
metaphorical.  Cancer works, at the most basic level, through the transformation of cells – in 
this respect it is symbolic of Walter’s transformation into Heisenberg.5  As transcendental 
materialism suggests – as one does, so they become.  This is a kind of ‘fluent’ determinism, 
the transcendental materialist subject becomes what s/he is at the core of their being as part of 
their ongoing process of becoming.  The sceptical reader is reminded that as Walter becomes 
Heisenberg, he is at the same time on his way to becoming someone/something else.  The core 
of this argument is visible here through Breaking Bad: criminologists ought to think more 
openly about the role of social neurobiology in their field.  When viewed in this light, this show 
constitutes an important cultural manifestation of ongoing criminological debates surrounding 
human agency and violence.  However, as promising as it might appear, this presents some 





The One Who Waits: Skyler White and Female Violence 
 
Skyler: I don’t know!  This is the best I could come up with, okay?  I will count every minute 
that the kids are away from here, away from you, as a victory.  But you’re right.  It’s a bad 
plan.  I don’t have any of your magic, Walt.  I don’t know what to do.  I’m a coward.  I can’t 
go to the police.  I can’t stop laundering your money.  I can’t keep you out of this house.  I 
can’t even keep you out of my bed.  All I can do is wait.  That’s it.  That’s the only good 
option.  Hold on, bide my time, and wait. 
 
Walt: Wait for what?  What are you waiting for? 
 
Skyler: For the cancer to come back. 
Walter and Skyler White, S05 E04 
 
The above is poignantly emblematic of Breaking Bad’s depiction of a reduced feminine 
capacity for violence.  The scene takes place in the bedroom, with Skyler in the marital bed 
and Walter stood next to it looking down over her.  This is exactly the same positioning of the 
scene quoted to open the previous section in which Walter declared himself to be ‘the danger’, 
and the symbolic importance of this should not be underestimated.  To add context again, 
Skyler is now embedded in Walter’s criminality.  She works in the car wash business he has 
purchased laundering his money, all the time keeping it secret from their family.  To keep up 
appearances, Walter is now back living in the family home and acting like all is well, yet Skyler 
does not share his optimism.  Her realisation in this scene is that she is trapped – that there is 
nothing she can do about her predicament and that, crucially, this is reducible to her femininity.  
As she admits, she has none of Walt’s ‘magic’; she cannot be violent in the same way he can.  
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The only way she can enact violence against him is through waiting, through standing back 
and waiting for his cancer to return and kill him because, ultimately, as a woman she lacks the 
ability to do this herself. 
The ‘double stake’ of popular culture is evident here; while Breaking Bad challenges the 
hegemonic grip of symbolic interactionist theories of human agency in criminology, it 
concomitantly conveys and strengthens patriarchal ideologies of gender.  In this respect, the 
show is not alone; it is certainly not ground-breaking to claim that popular culture 
misrepresents women at best, and at worst is purely misogynistic.  The processes by which 
popular media (mis)represent women have been rendered clear elsewhere, and importantly, the 
ways in which this is criminologically significant have too (see Humphries, 2009; Rafter, 2006; 
Rafter and Brown, 2011).  In Breaking Bad the viewer sees ample evidence of these processes 
at work.  Through Skyler, female violence is (re)presented very differently to that of the show’s 
men; her violence is passive, indirect, and at times, highly sexualised.  This is categorically not 
to imply that it is any less harmful; in this instance, ‘passive’ and ‘indirect’ are used to refer to 
more symbolic than physical manifestations of violence.  The crux of the matter is that Skyler’s 
violence is (re)presented in this show as being markedly different to that of the male characters, 
and as such, Breaking Bad’s imposition in the present context is that it requires special attention 
theoretically to understand it. 
Skyler demonstrates the indirect nature of her violence in the opening quotation above, but 
a prime example of the ways in which it is sexualised comes in S03 E03 (entitled, I.F.T.).  
Having moved back into the home and having avoided Skyler’s attempts to have him removed 
by the police, Walter is preparing dinner when Skyler returns from work.  While Walter talks 
of the progress he thinks they are making in their relationship, she calmly leans towards him 
and tells him that she has slept with her boss (‘I Fucked Ted’).  This is not (re)presented as a 
woman making free sexual choices however, it is instead emblematic of a woman enacting 
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violence upon a man through her sexuality.  This is Skyler being violent towards Walter in the 
only way that she, a woman, can.  In this respect, the show has significant congruence with 
emerging pathways of criminological research that position sexuality as a key concern of the 
intersections of feminist and cultural criminologies (Naegler and Salman, 2016).  However, the 
core point to make here is this – Breaking Bad presents both a challenge to some of 
criminology’s dominant conceptualisations of the will to violence (as exemplified above), but 
it can also provide a piercing critique of such theory through its gendered representations of 
peoples’ capacities to do harm.   
There is also a lot to be achieved here through using Breaking Bad and its misrepresentation 
of gender to problematise and critique the very same emerging and progressive theories of 
violence that it has been positioned above as emblematic of.  Feminist criminology has a long 
history of challenging the androcentric ‘malestream’ nature of the criminological enterprise 
(Smart (1976) being the classic example, Cullen et al. (2015) being a more contemporary one), 
and the current arguments are very much intended to follow this same path.  For example, while 
the criminological significance of transcendental materialism has been convincingly mapped 
out already (see Hall and Winlow, 2015; Winlow and Hall 2013), it would seem only in so far 
as it pertains to male offenders.  It is important to note here however that there are some very 
good reasons for this.  Winlow and Hall, as the chief architects of this theory, are undertaking 
its development as part of their wider project that is highly critical of the cultural study of 
gender and the ways in which it has figured in left-leaning ‘identity politics’.  Their most recent 
work stresses this fact: that criminology must discard its fascinations with the fields of ‘gender’ 
and ‘culture’ and work towards a model of progressive materialism in the form of what they 
call ‘ultra-realism’.  This, for Winlow and Hall (2015) is a new perspective on crime and 
deviance based upon the conceptual apparatus of transcendental materialism and the pseudo-
pacification process.  Yet, this position can be fruitfully interrogated through Breaking Bad. 
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The ontology of transcendental materialism that Hall and Winlow (2015) rely upon is – 
despite multiple layers of complexity and nuance – reducible down to the biosocial interface 
described above, to a synthesis between the fields of philosophy and neuroscience.6  That is, 
this model of human action is predicated upon understanding subjectivity as emerging out of a 
material (as in, neurobiological) base, and then becoming enmeshed in a dialectic interplay 
between this base and the social symbolic sphere that it is located within.  In this sense, the 
human subject is understood to exist in a ‘third space’, somewhere between the body and the 
environment (Žižek (2006) uses the analogy of a ‘parallax view’ to explain this).  However, if 
this is the case, then there are questions that must be asked around gender.  This is because, 
very bluntly, there are a number of well-established biological and sociological differences 
between male and female material bodies and the ways in which they are socially experienced.  
Thus, if criminology is to direct its attention towards the rapidly advancing field of 
neurobiology – and it is argued here that it absolutely should, and should do so quickly – then 
one of the first tasks that this must involve is the sustained interrogation of how the process 
operates along the lines of gender.  That is, questions have to be asked around whether or not 
the transcendental materialist subject advocated by Winlow and Hall, and so poignantly 
symbolised through Breaking Bad, has gendered elements to its existence or is in fact a 
universal subject?  Again, this is not an attack on the works of ultra-realist criminologists – the 
theoretical developments they have spearheaded are some of the most promising in 
criminology’s history.7  However, it is to assert that the question of gender must be engaged 
with more comprehensively if this model of the human subject is to fulfil its posited potential. 
In this respect then, the heuristic utility of Breaking Bad is further solidified; it is emblematic 
of a general conveyance of patriarchal ideology that circulates through popular culture and 
some sections of academic criminology alike.  Again, it represents the double stake of 
hegemony and change that cultural forms always contain.  Breaking Bad is at the same time 
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challenging of intellectual hegemony, and a conduit of patriarchal ideology.  It (re)presents 
male and female propensities for criminality differently, and this matters.  For example, 
Skyler’s sister, Marie Schrader (Betsy Brandt), is a shoplifter, and in later seasons the viewer 
sees her visiting ‘open houses’ to steal people’s possessions while faking her interest in buying 
the property.  However, this is (re)presented as something more akin to a ‘phase’ that she is 
going through than it is actually petty criminality.  This feminine-type of offending does not 
seem to need the intervention of the criminal justice system, but is actually treatable through 
the therapy that Marie is revealed to seek for it.  The show, like some sections of criminological 
theory, appears to have difficulty accounting for women’s propensities to ‘break bad’ – it 
(re)presents them differently to those of men.  
However, even with the above considered, the best example of the show’s distinctions 
between the masculine and the feminine is to be found in S05 E04, which sees Skyler walk 
fully clothed into a swimming pool in the company of Walter, Marie and Hank at Walt’s 51st 
birthday celebration.  This is (re)presented as her cry for help; it is her showing her family that 
something is wrong.  This scene is crucially important – it is by the same pool that Walter 
regularly sits and plots his activities.  In an early episode, the viewer witnesses him flicking 
matches into the pool as he schemes, they float atop of the calm water.  In the face of his crisis, 
Walter, the man, stays afloat – metaphorically, he swims.  Yet in the face of her crises, Skyler 
sinks.8  In this respect, Breaking Bad can be firmly situated as symbolic of contemporary 
criminological debates about violence; there is a strong heuristic parallel to be drawn between 
the (mis)representation of female offending in the show and its intellectual neglect in some 




Towards Some Conclusions 
 
Skyler: I didn’t marry a criminal.  
 
Attorney: Well, you’re married to one now. 
Skyler White and her Attorney, S05 E03 
 
The above exchange takes place in the office of the attorney Skyler is talking to about her 
options for leaving Walter.  Upon receiving assurances of confidentiality, she is tearfully 
attempting to make sense of her situation.  In her mind, she did not marry a bad man.   However, 
her attorney’s response is more than prescient here: Skyler is married to a bad man now, Walter 
is not Walter anymore, he has become Heisenberg.  In this respect, the show has been presented 
as symbolic of ongoing criminological debates about the ways in which people become violent.  
This matters to criminology at present because the increasing strength and intellectual 
capabilities of the biological sciences mean they can no longer be dismissed as easily as they 
once were.  Biosocial theory is not neo-phrenology, and criminologists who would write it off 
as such do so at their peril.  It is hoped that the present article has gone some way towards 
making this case. 
This considered, it is important to think critically about the above in closing.  For example, 
it is noteworthy that the growth of neuroimaging research and technology – that all the 
neuroscience alluded to above is effectively predicated upon – has not occurred without critical 
voices of dissent accompanying it.  In a controversial essay Edward Vul and colleagues, 
prominent neuroscientists themselves, call into question the methodological validity of many 
studies presenting ‘puzzlingly high correlations’ between personality measures and brain 
activations (Vul et al., 2009).9  Their argument is centered upon the use of unsound statistical 
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measures of correlation between these two variables.  They go on to note however, that there 
is a much wider reaching implication of this – that many studies purporting the brain’s 
significant role in any given phenomena may be unsound.  The brain might very well be doing 
something viewable and measurable through new technologies like the fMRI machine, but 
whether or not this directly correlates with significant outcomes in the human subject – their 
behaviour, motivations, thoughts and/or proclivities – is far from definitively established at 
present.10 
Furthermore, it is not just potentially dubious science that ought to be considered critically.  
There are also philosophical questions that theorists adopting transcendental materialism 
perhaps ought to address.  The most paramount of these being the somewhat cold reception the 
model has received from Slavoj Žižek himself (the very thinker whose ontology Johnston 
(2008) developed the model through).  In what is arguably his most comprehensive work to 
date, Less Than Nothing, Žižek (2012: 906) calls transcendental materialism an ‘oxymoron’, 
and then later goes on to stress in Absolute Recoil the fact that it is Johnston’s term, and that 
he does not use it himself (2014: 224).  Whilst this need not necessarily be problematic in of 
itself, it perhaps requires some sort of explanation/clarification to help the criminological 
extrapolation of the model stand up to scrutiny. 
These limitations of the biosocial interface must be recognised and critically reflected upon 
by criminologists.  Yet, at the same time, it must also be recognised that this field has come a 
long way since Cesare Lombroso was measuring the distances between people’s eyes.  There 
is significant potential to be found in contemporary philosophies of the human subject that 
recognise its material basis, and the ways in which neural plasticity impacts upon people and 
their actions/reactions.  As a model of human subjectivity, the transcendental materialism 
advocated by Hall and Winlow (2015) is arguably one of the most significant theoretical 
advances criminologists have made to date.  But, as outlined above, the model remains 
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critically under-theorised with recourse to gender.  This is not a direct critique of Winlow and 
Hall’s work – their task was to highlight the potential of the theory and reveal its criminological 
significance.  They have more than achieved this.  Rather, it is offered here as a call to others 
to pick up this challenge and seek to investigate critically the potential strengths and 
weaknesses of alternative conceptualisations of the human subject such as this in criminology. 
It is for this very reason that Breaking Bad has been presented as a means to this end – it 
exists as a cultural component of ongoing criminological debates such as the above around the 
nature of interpersonal violence.  Its criminological significance is more than assured, and as 
such it is very much hoped that this article has further strengthened the position of cultural 
analyses like this in criminology.  As a representation of a criminological subject, Breaking 
Bad provides a means by which some orthodox theories within criminology can be challenged, 
but it also provides a platform on which their progressive alternatives can be as well.  In this 
sense, the show does the same as all other truly great examples of fiction – it invites its 
viewer/reader/listener to think differently about the worlds in which they live.  Walter White 
opened up the show by arguing that life is about chemistry, and that chemistry is basically 
about understanding that things change.  In this respect, it can be argued here to close that 
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1. As a possible exception to this there is a short essay at the end of Guffey and Koontz’s 
(2014) Breaking Bad companion volume concerning the ‘violentization’ thesis of the 
sociologist Lonnie Athens (1992) as it pertains to the show.  Interesting as this is, it is 
far too brief to be considered a full and/or sustained analysis. 
2. Breaking Bad was originally pitched to studio executives as the tale of a man who 
transforms himself from ‘Mr Chips’, the eventually gentle and loving central 
protagonist of Sam Wood’s (1939) cinematic classic Goodbye, Mr Chips, to ‘Scarface’, 
the alias of Tony Montana, the psychotic drug lord in Brian De Palma’s (1983) 
masterpiece of the same name. 
3. This number excludes those killed in the plane crash.  If Walter’s role in this is 
recognised as causal (which it very probably should be), he is responsible for 194 deaths 
across the show’s five seasons. 
4. When calling himself Heisenberg, Walter is making reference to W. K.  Heisenberg, 
the famous German quantum physicist whose ‘uncertainty principle’ is neatly 
emblematic of the Walter-Heisenberg transformation.  Heisenberg’s uncertainty 
principle states that in knowing two variables, the more precise one is on the qualities 
of one, the less certain they can be around the qualities of the other.  That is, in the 
relationship between X and Y, the more one knows of variable X, the less they can hope 
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to know of variable Y, and vice versa.  Thus, the more the Breaking Bad viewer comes 
to know Heisenberg, the less they can know of Walter. 
5. The symbolic significance of this should not be underestimated; the show is full of such 
symbolism.  Walter does not have cancer, he is cancer.  The show is not about 
methamphetamine, it is actually symbolic of it too – rarely if ever do users have just 
one pipe of meth, like rarely if ever do viewers watch just one episode of Breaking Bad. 
6. In actuality, there are three fields relevant to this synthesis, with the third being the 
psychoanalytic work of Jacques Lacan (e.g. Lacan, 2006).  However, as this forms a 
core component of Žižek’s work, it is understood here as already figuring in the 
philosophical component of the two-way synthesis outlined above. 
7. This admittedly bold statement can be supported by looking at the ways in which these 
ideas are being embraced by a range of new and emerging criminological thinkers (e.g., 
Ellis, 2016; Raymen, 2016; Smith and Raymen, 2016; Wakeman, 2015, 2016).   
8. Of course, this analysis of the situation is based upon my own subjective reading of this 
particular piece of crime media.  During the peer review process one of the article’s 
reviewers suggested that my interpretation was wrong, that it was in fact Walter who 
sinks deeper and deeper into his own internal toxicity – that even if he does float, he 
does so ‘without a mooring’.  While I stand by my original reading I found this 
alternative suggestion to be more than compelling, and certainly worthy of recognition 
here. 
9. Vul et al. (2009) was originally titled ‘Voodoo Correlations in Social Neuroscience’, 
but was renamed at the request of the editors of the journal it was published in.  The 
paper drew considerable response, positive and otherwise, most of which has been 
collected by Vul and is viewable on his website: www.edvul.com  
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10. Interestingly here, Fine (2013) has noted these discrepancies to be gendered too; she 
argues that ‘neurosexism’ is present in contemporary neurobiology, as many studies of 
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